





Constitutional change under the first UK coalition government for many years has exhibited a full 
range of characteristics: from skilful adaptation of governing arrangements in a famously flexible 
constitution to ill-conceived reforms inside Whitehall, and on to panic in the face of a remarkable 
exercise in popular sovereignty. The chapter elaborates on this by looking in turn at three main 
aspects, beginning with the constitutional footprint produced by the fact of the Cameron–Clegg 
administration. Developments relating to the office of prime minister (and deputy prime minster), 
and especially to the need to sustain coalition government through restrictions on termination and 
via the convention of collective ministerial responsibility, are key features. As regards the second 
main aspect, the constitutional position of the Civil Service and the relations of ministers with agen-
cies and officials, the Cameron–Clegg government is seen generating more heat than light. The 
overarching demand for austerity has naturally been a chief driver of reform, but, set in terms of 
some important historical benchmarks, several significant initiatives appear poorly thought through. 
The territorial distribution of executive power in the UK especially in the light of the Scottish inde-
pendence referendum is—of course—the third main aspect. With an eye to a looser Union (state), the 
chapter highlights the demand to rework traditional—centralized—conceptualizations of the ‘execu-
tive’, a basic territorial duality of the Whitehall machine, and the special demands placed on Whitehall 
if the Union is to survive and prosper. Descriptively telling and suitably provocative, the conceptual 
label ‘UK (English) government’ is introduced into the lexicon of the changing constitution.
T W E A K I NG A N D F I X I NG ,  R EV E RT I NG :  
T WO PA RT Y G OV E R N M E N T
V E N T U R I NG T H E U N FA M I L I A R
Truly a case of the novel and challenging, May 2010 witnessed the establishment of 
the first peacetime coalition government at Westminster since the 1930s. Successful 
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in becoming the largest party, but failing to secure a majority in the House of 
Commons at the UK general election, the Conservatives led by new Prime Minister 
David Cameron had struck deals on policy and process with the third party, the 
Liberal Democrats, led by new Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg. Eschewing other 
possible outcomes from an inconclusive exercise in popular will, for example minor-
ity government with an agreement to provide ‘confidence and supply’, it was time 
they explained in suitably uplifting fashion for ‘partnership government . . . inspired 
by the values of freedom, fairness and responsibility’.1 In creating a majority admin-
istration jointly maintained by some 56 per cent of MPs, the demand for stability 
and firm action on the public finances in the wake of the global financial crisis was 
naturally uppermost.2
From the constitutional standpoint, the Cameron–Clegg experiment com-
mands attention precisely because many conventions and elements of constitu-
tional practice relating to the Westminster model of parliamentary government 
developed under single party (commonly majority) rule,3 a hitherto dominant 
set of political conditions effectively buttressed by the non-proportional elec-
toral system misleadingly called ‘first past the post’. Conversely, the advent of 
coalition government at Westminster in part ref lects long-term trends in voting 
behaviour: a decline in major party allegiances and increased representation for 
a variety of smaller parties.4 Nor does the dynamic show much sign of slacken-
ing: quite the reverse! The auguries for single-party majority rule, in other words, 
are not good.
There obviously was a wealth of comparative material on coalition govern-
ment to draw upon:  close to home in the context of devolution, particularly from 
Commonwealth countries like New Zealand, and also from other EU member states.5 
Then Cabinet Secretary Gus O’Donnell was notably assiduous in preparing the ground 
by taking on board comparative experience and helping to facilitate the intense politi-
cal negotiations leading to government formation.6 The change-over was duly under-
written in what would be grandly called ‘the Coalition documentation’. Ranging 
widely across the policy piece, the 30-page Programme for Government would in turn 
provide an official benchmark of life under the Cameron–Clegg administration.7 
1 HM Government, The Coalition: Our Programme for Government (20 May 2010), foreword. This docu-
ment built on an initial set of policy determinations: Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, Agreements 
Reached (11 May 2010).
2 For more or less racy accounts of the creation, see David Laws, 22 Days in May: The Birth of the Lib 
Dem–Conservative Coalition (2010); and (giving a Labour perspective), Andrew Adonis, 5 Days in May: The 
Coalition and Beyond (2013).
3 See to this effect, House of Lords Constitution Committee, Constitutional Implications of Coalition 
Government, HL 130 (2013–14).
4 For details, see House of Commons Library, UK Election Statistics 1918–2012 (2012).
5 As exemplified by K. Strøm et al., Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in 
Western Europe (2008).
6 See UK Cabinet Office, Civil Service Support to Coalition Negotiations (2010).
7 HM Government, The Coalition:  Together in the National Interest—Mid-term Review (2013); and 
Programme for Government Update (2013).
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For present purposes, the four-page Agreement for Stability and Reform on how the 
parties envisaged their coalition government operating is especially  noteworthy.8 
As a major example of ‘soft law’—in broad terms the use of rules and/or agree-
ments which, better to preserve political space and/or administrative flexibility, are 
not intended to be directly legally enforceable—it signalled some thoughtful tweak-
ing in a famously flexible uncodified constitution, indeed one in which hard law is 
strikingly absent in matters like the office of prime minister.9 If strictly conceived 
there was ‘no constitutional difference’ between coalition and single-party govern-
ment, ‘working practices need[ed] to adapt’. As for the lovey-dovey stuff, the Coalition 
parties would ‘work together effectively to deliver our programme, on the basis of 
goodwill, mutual trust and agreed procedures which foster collective decision mak-
ing and responsibility while respecting each party’s identity’.10
It was one thing to exchange vows, another to make them stick. A most practical 
exercise in political self-preservation, especially on the part of Liberal Democrats 
otherwise vulnerable to the prime minister’s use of prerogative power to go to the 
country when it suited the Conservatives, longevity was the first item in the parties’ 
agreement. It declared their intention not only to see out the maximum five-year 
term, but also to bring forward legislation, now the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 
2011,11 to change the constitutional rules of the political game.12 ‘The scaffolding for 
the coalition building’ is an apt—insider’s—description.13
The new dispensation had been signalled in the Liberal Democrats’ election mani-
festo but not in the Conservatives’ one. So it could be said not to enjoy the protection 
against House of Lords interference under the classic Salisbury–Addison convention.14 
The title of the Act is of course a misnomer since, in establishing the default posi-
tion of a five-year term, the legislation provides for early dissolution through either 
a two-thirds vote of MPs or, express space for wheeling and dealing, a success-
ful motion of no confidence and then no successful motion of confidence within 
14 days. On the one hand, in reducing the prime minister’s room for manoeuvre, 
with putative knock-on effects in terms of political leverage and party management, 
the Act naturally colours the calculations over government formation in a future 
‘hung’ Parliament.15 On the other hand, the legislation stands for twin diminutions 
in democratic accountability: fewer expressions of popular will through the ballot 
8 Coalition Agreement for Stability and Reform (May 2010).
9 R. Rawlings, ‘Soft Law Never Dies’ in D. Feldman and M. Elliott (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Public 
Law (forthcoming).
10 Coalition Agreement for Stability and Reform, 1.
11 See House of Lords Constitution Committee, Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, HL 69 (2010–11).
12 Coalition Agreement for Stability and Reform, 1.
13 Constitutional Implications of Coalition Government, para. 13. See further, V. Bogdanor, The Coalition 
and the Constitution (2011), ch. 6.
14 For discussion of this convention in the conditions of coalition government, see Constitutional 
Implications of Coalition Government, paras. 93–100.
15 For backbench musings as the 2015 UK general election approached, see Hansard, HC, cols. 1069–113 
(23 October 2014).
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box and lessened capacity of the House of Commons to bring down a government. 
In fact, the Programme for Government envisaged a trigger of 55 per cent of MPs, a 
figure also just above the then proportion of all non-Conservative Members; only in 
the light of opposition complaints of gerrymandering was the threshold raised.16 It 
all adds up to a telling cocktail of formal statute and opaque and fraught workings 
of a famously termed ‘political constitution’.17
ON H IGH
The second item in the Agreement concerned distribution of the spoils. At the heart 
of this was a self-declared ‘principle of balance’, boldly portrayed as underpinning 
‘all aspects of the conduct of the Government’s business, including the allocation of 
responsibilities, the Government’s policy and legislative programme . . . and the reso-
lution of disputes’. Underlining the importance of political patronage, it was imme-
diately given tangible expression through a ‘share of Cabinet, Ministerial and Whip 
appointments . . . approximately in proportion to the size of the two Parliamentary 
parties’.18
A quick look round the UK Cabinet table is revealing.19 The Conservatives as 
the much larger party take an iron grip on, first, the historic ‘great offices of State’ 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer, Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary); and, secondly, the 
big-spending departments (Work and Pensions, Health, Defence, etc.) Meanwhile, 
naturally concerned as the smaller party to guard the Programme for Government, 
the Liberal Democrats opt for width over concentration, with representation in most, 
though not all, government departments. As Deputy Prime Minster Clegg later 
explained, being ‘held responsible for everything the government do but having no 
say in what they do across the piece’ represented for the party ‘the worst of all worlds’.20 
Very much a story of ‘one-out, one-in’, the basic pattern of ministerial representation 
would endure throughout the life of the administration, as indeed the Agreement had 
envisaged.
From the constitutional standpoint, attention naturally focuses on the position 
of the prime minister. After all, a pre-existing historical process of increased prime 
ministerial functions, even elements of a presidential-type role, is amply attested 
in the literature.21 ‘A guide to laws, conventions and rules on the operation of 
16 Programme for Government, 26; Hansard, HC, cols. 628–9 (13 September 2010).
17 J. Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1.
18 Coalition Agreement for Stability and Reform, 1.
19 For further details, see M. Debus, ‘Portfolio Allocation and Policy Compromises: How and Why the 
Conservatives Formed a Coalition Government’ (2011) 82 Pol Q 293; and T. Heppell, ‘Ministerial Selection 
and Portfolio Allocation in the Cameron Government’ (2014) 67 Parliamentary Affairs 64.
20 House of Lords Constitution Committee, Annual Oral Evidence Session with the Deputy Prime 
Minister (9 April 2014), 12.
21 P. Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders since 1945 (2000); A. Blick and G. Jones, 
Premiership: The Development, Nature and Power of the Office of the British Prime Minister (2010).
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government’ and first fully published in 2011, the UK Cabinet Manual is today the 
obvious reference point. Reflecting and reinforcing the orthodox understanding, 
the Manual solemnly explains that the prime minister has ‘certain prerogatives’, for 
example ‘recommending the appointment of ministers’ and ‘determining the mem-
bership of Cabinet and Cabinet committees’; ‘however, in some circumstances the 
Prime Minister may agree to consult others before exercising those prerogatives’.22 
Yet as the Agreement had already made evident, this is apt to be economical with 
the truth in the conditions of coalition. Constitutional nicety recorded: ‘the Prime 
Minister, following consultation with the Deputy Prime Minister, will make nomi-
nations for the appointment of Ministers’. Constitutional practice reworked:  ‘the 
Prime Minister will nominate Conservative Party Ministers’, ‘the Deputy Prime 
Minister will nominate Liberal Democrat Ministers’, they ‘will agree the nomi-
nation of the Law Officers’.23 Confused and confusing yes, but nonetheless some 
important precedent was being set, to the effect of blurring a hitherto clear line of 
constitutional responsibility.
Political scientists have had a field day debating the shifting balances of power 
(or not) inside the Cameron–Clegg administration. Given that forming a coa-
lition government involves compromise, broader questions are raised about 
intra-executive political leverage,24 as well as institutional resources,25 and in par-
ticular about how far the prime minister is constrained by, and more likely con-
strains, the deputy prime minister. After all, our constitutional actors had again 
to venture the unfamiliar. Although the role of deputy prime minister became 
increasingly familiar in the past half-century, the wartime Churchill–Atlee 
Administration provided the only previous example in coalition government, 
hardly equivalent. In the event, testimony to the innate sensitivities of coalition 
politics, the Agreement was notably fulsome in buttressing the deputy prime min-
ister’s otherwise vulnerable constitutional position. For example, ‘close consulta-
tion’ between the prime minister and deputy prime minister would help found 
‘the Coalition’s success.’ More concretely, the establishment and terms of refer-
ence of all Cabinet committees would now require the agreement of the deputy 
prime minister, who would also serve, or nominate anther (Liberal Democrat) 
minister to serve, on each Cabinet committee and subcommittee. As against a 
presidential-style model of concentrated informational and agenda-setting pow-
ers, a second ‘general principle’ was established of the prime minister and deputy 
prime minister both having a full and contemporaneous overview of the business 
of government, with each having the power to commission papers from the Cabinet 
22 UK Cabinet Office, Cabinet Manual (2011), para. 3.3.
23 Coalition Agreement for Stability and Reform, 1.
24 For this genre, see M. Bennister and R. Heffernan, ‘Cameron as Prime Minister: The Intra-Executive 
Politics of Britain’s Coalition Government’ (2012) 65 Parliamentary Affairs 778.
25 See House of Lords Constitution Committee, The Cabinet Office and the Centre of Government, HL 30 
(2009–10); also, Institute for Government, Centre Forward, Effective Support for the Prime Minister at the 
Centre of Government (2014).
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secretariat.26 Reverting to the UK Cabinet Manual, a single bland paragraph on 
the deputy prime minister has again obscured a richer tapestry.27 Perhaps not 
surprisingly, Mr Clegg would continue to portray his position as ‘quite different’ 
in function, content, and powers from previous holders of the title in single-party 
government.28 On the basis of a lengthy inquiry into the office of prime minister,29 
the Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee has though 
reached similar conclusions. Naturally enough, with the powers of the prime 
minister somewhat constrained, coalition government ‘made a more collegiate 
style of government necessary’.30
H A NGI NG TO GE T H E R
The principle of collective responsibility, which of course provides the basis of 
Cabinet government, was the other main item in the parties’ Agreement. As the Lords’ 
Constitution Committee later observed in a wide-ranging report on the constitutional 
implications of coalition government, this would be the convention most affected.31 
There was though a modicum of constitutional practice to go on in the shape of ‘agree-
ments to disagree’ on particular issues. Tariff reform is the famous example from the 
National government in 1931–2, with the other two occasions, also involving agree-
ments made collectively by the Cabinet, being under Labour in the 1970s (the refer-
endum on EEC membership and direct elections to the European Parliament). For 
the new coalition partners, it was then a case, first, of underscoring the importance of 
day-to-day routines of collective ministerial responsibility; and, secondly, by building 
on constitutional precedent, of reflecting the political reality that a coalition cannot be 
expected to agree on every issue.
Picking up on the twin input and output functions of the convention, collec-
tive development of policy with a view to better decisions, and public presentation 
of, and responsibility to Parliament of the whole government for, agreed policies, 
the Agreement carefully rehearsed the disciplines. The language is familiar from 
the UK Ministerial Code and Cabinet Manual:32 ‘an appropriate degree’ of con-
sultation and discussion among ministers to allow them ‘to express their views 
frankly as decisions are reached’; ‘opinions expressed . . . within Government to 
remain private’; and ‘decisions of the Cabinet to be binding on and supported 
by all Minsters’—save, that is, where the convention ‘is explicitly set aside’.33 The 
Programme for Government duly specified five matters on which the parties could 
26 Coalition Agreement for Stability and Reform, 2. 27 Cabinet Manual, para. 3.11.
28 ‘Annual Oral Evidence Session with the Deputy Prime Minister’, 13. Mr Clegg had also been appointed 
Lord President of the Council, with ministerial responsibility for political and constitutional reform.
29 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Role and Powers of the Prime Minister, HC 351 
(2014–15).
30 Ibid, 20. 31 Constitutional Implications of Coalition Government, 4.
32 UK Ministerial Code, paras. 2.1–2.4; Cabinet Manual, paras. 4.1–4.4.
33 Coalition Agreement for Stability and Reform, 2. The standard exceptions to consultation, such as the 
Chancellor’s Budget judgements, were naturally catered for.
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disagree, among them renewal of the UK’s nuclear deterrent and the (ill-fated) ref-
erendum on electing the House of Commons by Alternative Vote. Thus far, it may 
be said, suitably transparent and constitutionally rigorous. The Coalition govern-
ment could now secure a requisite element of legitimacy through the vote on the 
Queen’s Speech.34
But of course not all eventualities could be anticipated. The architects of the 
Agreement were rightly concerned to establish standing machinery to oversee the 
functioning of the government and implementation of the Programme; and, more 
especially, for the resolution of disputes between the parties. Provision was thus made 
for a ‘Coalition Committee’ co-chaired by the prime minister and deputy prime min-
ister and with equal numbers of Conservative and Liberal Democrat ministers.35 
Perhaps not surprisingly however, this body was rapidly superseded by more stream-
lined machinery in the form of the so-called ‘Quad’: regular meetings between the 
prime minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the deputy prime minister 
and (a second Liberal Democrat) the Chief Secretary to the Treasury.36 Putting this 
in constitutional perspective, the fact of the Quad, a kind of equally balanced ‘inner 
Cabinet’, underwrote the constraint on prime ministerial authority. The considerable 
space for informal or highly contextual political arrangements at the heart of govern-
ment is further highlighted.
The rosy days of May 2010 would soon give way to a burst of backbench 
Conservative rebellion, which in fluctuating fashion then proceeded to dog the 
life of the government.37 So too, the convention of collective responsibility would 
come under increased strain, reflected in some extraordinary acts of constitutional 
and political theatre. These include the prime minister and deputy prime minister 
making separate statements to the House in response to the Leveson report on 
media regulation,38 and a free vote for Conservative MPs on an amendment regret-
ting the absence of an EU referendum bill in the 2013 Queen’s Speech.39 The most 
politically contentious however was the decision by the Liberal Democrats to agree 
with a Lords amendment40 postponing the review of constituency boundaries 
until after the 2015 UK general election, in practice to the Conservatives’ disad-
vantage. According to Deputy Prime Minister Clegg, this setting aside of collective 
responsibility outside the terms of the Agreement was justified because of continu-
ing opposition to the (ill-fated) House of Lords Reform bill, already bogged-down 
34 See Constitutional Implications of Coalition Government, ch. 3.
35 Coalition Agreement for Stability and Reform, 3.
36 See further, R. Hazell, ‘How the Coalition Works at the Centre’ in R. Hazell and B. Yong, The Politics 
of Coalition (2012).
37 House of Commons Library, Coalitions at Westminster (2014), provides references. For critical per-
spectives on the competing ideologies, see M. Beech and S. Lee, The Cameron–Clegg Government: Coalition 
Politics in an Age of Austerity (2011).
38 Hansard, HC, cols. 446–82 (29 November 2012). See also, Hansard, HC, cols. 282–304WH 
(13 February 2013).
39 Hansard, HC, cols. 669, 749 (15 May 2013).
40 To the Electoral Registration and Administration Bill; see Hansard, HC, cols. 806–40 (29 January 2013).
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in the House of Commons. A key part of what he was pleased to call ‘the coali-
tion’s contract’ had been broken.41 Not so said the then Conservative Leader of the 
House of Lords, Lord Strathclyde, declaring the Liberal Democrats guilty of ‘a dirty 
trick’; the boundary review had as political consideration the AV referendum.42  
Be this as it may, the recriminations would persist through the lifetime of the 
government.43
Civilized partnership, uneasy cohabitation and divorce constitute a simple but 
neat way of visualizing the life-cycle of the Coalition.44 Most obviously with a view to 
exploring possible policy lines and to projecting distinct identities, it would be strange 
indeed if ministers in both parties had not increasingly expressed differing views as 
the 2015 UK general election loomed ever larger. For which read, in the party confer-
ence season, welfare reform, immigration, and always Europe,45 to name but a few. 
Constitutionally speaking, the touchstone of this reversion in favour of single-party 
politics is the Conservative Party’s policy document Protecting Human Rights in the 
UK published in October 2014.46 In making proposals that involved replacing the 
Human Rights Act 1998 with a British Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, this was a 
controversial document, to put it mildly. Correctly, however, it did not appear under 
an official government imprimatur, being produced instead in-house. Though one 
cannot help but feel that had the document been subject to the usual governmental 
processes of legal as well as political scrutiny, it would have been, at the very least, 
more tightly drafted.47
Published in February 2014, the Constitution Committee’s report on the consti-
tutional implications of coalition government made some useful recommendations, 
chief among them on collective responsibility. As one would expect, these senior 
Parliamentarians stood firmly on the constitutional importance of the convention; 
setting aside ‘should be rare, and only ever a last resort’. Effectively supplying a miss-
ing piece in the jigsaw of the parties’ Agreement, the Committee made the case for 
a standing process to govern such exigencies in this and any other future coalition 
government. A clear nod in the direction of collegiality, the Cabinet as a whole should 
agree a specific exception preferably for a specified period of time; ‘rules’ should be 
set out governing how ministers may express their differing views.48 Properly timed 
as a prompt to ministers, the report also concentrated on matters relating to the end 
of the Parliament, for example legislative practice (the ‘wash-up’) and access to papers 
41 ‘Nick Clegg: Lords Reform to Be Abandoned’, BBC News (6 August 2012).
42 Constitutional Implications of Coalition Government, para. 71.
43 See Hansard, HL, cols. 1812–58 (13 May 2014).
44 See in this vein, R. Hayton, ‘Conservative Party Statecraft and the Politics of Coalition’ (2014) 67 
Parliamentary Affairs 6.
45 E. Goes, ‘The Coalition and Europe:  A  Tale of Reckless Drivers, Steady Navigators and Imperfect 
Roadmaps’ (2014) 67 Parliamentary Affairs 45.
46 Conservative Party, Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing 
Britain’s Human Rights Laws (2014).
47 See further, Colm O’Cinneide’s chapter in this volume (ch. 3).
48 Constitutional Implications of Coalition Government, paras. 78–9
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of a previous administration.49 However, in flagrant disregard of the conventional 
understanding of a reply within two months, important for effective parliamentary 
oversight of government, the minister was still prevaricating another six months 
later,50 a consequence presumably of disagreement between the Coalition parties. 
Eventually published in. . . . the response was short and bland.51 The Government rec-
ognised. . . . But. . . .52 PREDICTION OBVIOUSLY UPDATE.
T H R A SH I NG A BOU T:  M I N IST E R S ,  AGE NCI E S , 
A N D OFF ICI A L S
BE NC H M A R K S
Some 150 years ago, as Britain experienced an industrial revolution and approached 
the zenith of empire, the basis of today’s Civil Service was being laid. As state interven-
tion flowered in fields like public health, education, and the factories, so at home as 
well in the colonies there was an inexorable demand for a more capable bureaucracy. 
Opposing patronage and the buying of office, the justly famous Northcote–Trevelyan 
review53 grounded a system of entry and promotion on merit via open competition. 
Viewed in constitutional perspective, this reflected and reinforced the concept of a 
permanent and politically disinterested Civil Service; and, more particularly, core val-
ues of objectivity, impartiality, and integrity. As today’s UK Cabinet Manual puts it, 
first and foremost ‘the Civil Service supports the Government of the day in developing 
and implementing its policies, and in delivering public services’.54 However, a signifi-
cant feature in an uncodified constitution centred round parliamentary sovereignty, 
it is also implicit that the Civil Service ‘does not exist solely to serve the Government 
of the day, but also future governments’. Put slightly differently, it is ‘one of the great 
institutions of state, critical to the continuation and stability of government’.55
Some 100 years ago, against the backdrop of the Great War and also the beginnings 
of what would become known as the welfare state, much thought was being given to 
the organization and effective exercise of central government responsibilities. On from 
more ad hoc and piecemeal arrangements, the Haldane report established a deter-
minedly functional approach to the machinery of government premised on individual 
departments, whereby the ‘field of activity in the case of each department’ should be 
49 Ibid., ch. 5. See also Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Fixed-term Parliaments: The 
Final Year of a Parliament, HC 976 (2013–14); Institute for Government, Year Five: Whitehall and the Parties 
in the Final Year of Coalition (2014).
50 Hansard, HL, col. 154W (29 October 2014). 51 Ref UPDATE 52 Ref UPDATE
53 Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service, 1854, q/JN 426 NOR.
54 Cabinet Manual (1st edn, 2011), para. 7.1. But see later, Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 
2010, s. 7.
55 Public Administration Select Committee, Truth to Power: How Civil Service Reform Can Succeed, HC 
74 (2013–14), para. 1.
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‘the particular service which it renders to the community as a whole’.56 Expanding 
on Northcote–Trevelyan, which had spoken of a professional body of officials advis-
ing a minister with direct responsibility to Parliament, Haldane underwrote another 
key principle in the Westminster model of parliamentary government: the indivisible 
relationship of ministers and officials. For which read the mathematical-style formula 
of the great constitutional convention of individual ministerial responsibility: in the 
first, internal limb that civil servants are fully accountable to ministers; in the second, 
external limb that ministers are fully accountable to Parliament for all their and their 
department’s actions and omissions. Today the principle is given due prominence in 
both the Civil Service Code and the UK Cabinet Manual; to quote the Cameron–Clegg 
administration’s Civil Service Reform Plan, it is ‘well-established and underpins the 
effective working of Government’.57 There is a long-standing and important excep-
tion, the role of accounting officer, whereby, bound up with the historic constitutional 
functions of the House of Commons in providing for and overseeing government 
expenditure, Parliament holds designated senior civil servants directly to account for 
their stewardship of public funds.58
Some 50 years ago, in the twin contexts, first, of an expanded administrative appa-
ratus associated with ‘cradle to grave’ welfare provision and substantial public own-
ership in a mixed economy, and, secondly, of a country struggling to come to terms 
with relative economic decline and retreat from Empire, the Fulton Committee59 was 
tasked with considering issues of recruitment, management, and training with a view 
to ensuring that the Civil Service was properly equipped for its role in the modern 
state. Trumpeting a lack of skilled management, and also the limitations of a (public 
school) cult of the generalist in an increasingly technological age, Fulton’s mix of rec-
ommendations included a less rigid hierarchy (far fewer classes of civil servant), more 
responsibilities for specialists including scientists, and increased interchange with 
the private and voluntary sectors. The inquiry would be heavily criticized, in part for 
avoiding basic constitutional questions about the design of the Whitehall machinery, 
and in part for an evident failure of implementation in the face of resistance from the 
higher Civil Service.60 Yet in the long view, much in Fulton foreshadows the radical 
transformation of government, and particularly of administrative culture, pursued by 
the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher from 1979.61
It is worth pausing to consider how a student of the not-so changing constitution of 
the 1970s62 might have visualized the situation. Representing the model of (by now) 
big Whitehall departments constructed on the basis of strong bureaucratic hierarchy, 
56 Ministry of Reconstruction, Report of the Machinery of Government Committee, Cm 9230 (1918), 8.
57 HM Government, The Civil Service Reform Plan (June 2012), 20.
58 HM Treasury, Managing Public Money (updated version, July 2013), ch. 3.
59 The Civil Service, Report of the [Fulton] Committee 1966–68, vol. 1, Cm 3638 (1968).
60 P. Kellner and N. Crowther-Hunt, The Civil Servants: An Inquiry into Britain’s Ruling Class (1980).
61 R. Lowe, The Official History of the British Civil Service: Reforming the Civil Service, I: The Fulton Years, 
1966–81 (2011), provides a top-down perspective.
62 For a suitably provocative account, see N. Johnson, In Search of the Constitution (1977).
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a series of towering institutional pyramids dominates the scene.63 Individual depart-
ments are governed from on high through a (variable) mix of political direction from 
the Secretary of State and junior ministers and the administrative judgement of the 
Permanent Secretary and other ‘mandarins’; perhaps hopefully, the internal lines of 
managerial direction and accountability reach down through the middle ranks to the 
very many junior officials applying rules and rendering individual decisions. From 
the legal standpoint,64 two particular pieces of engineering help to sustain this set 
of structures. First, there is the time-hallowed method of statutory empowerment, 
whereby Parliament delegates public power to ‘the Secretary of State’. At one and 
the same time, the constitutional and administrative model of individual ministe-
rial responsibility is reflected and reinforced, and, since the statutory phrase also is a 
generic one, flexibility is preserved through an ongoing executive capacity to transfer 
functions.65 Secondly, giving tangible expression to the notion of indivisibility, there 
is the dose of judicial common-sense constituted in the Carltona principle;66 namely, 
that such are the multifarious functions of modern government, responsible officials 
may generally exercise them in the name of ministers.
Our student is also well-versed in the constitutional learning associated with the 
famous episode of ‘Crichel Down’ (1954), in which a minister resigned ostensibly 
over serious errors by officials.67 This is the flipside or shielding aspect of individual 
ministerial responsibility, whereby, helping to keep the Civil Service out of the politi-
cal arena, the minister is expected to protect officials carrying out orders or prop-
erly implementing a policy, and not to subject them to public criticism for minor 
mistakes.68 Already however questions are raised about the practical workings in view 
of the growth in the size and complexity of the state and a propensity among min-
isters to distance themselves from government blunders.69 Much, however, remains 
shrouded in mystery, and designedly so, by reason of the draconian Official Secrets 
Act 1911.70 According to the classic routines, the MP may inquire of the minister who, 
suitably briefed, will give an answer to the question, but generally no more than that. 
Only in 1967 was the Parliamentary Ombudsman created as a supplementary means 
of chasing down maladministration through a dose of investigative technique.71 
Meanwhile, testimony to the strength of the conventional paradigm, direct engage-
ment between parliamentarians and civil servants remains sporadic and peripheral. 
Only in 1979 would a properly planned select committee system be established in the 
63 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (1st edn, 1984).
64 For classic accounts, see R. Brazier Ministers of the Crown (1997); and T. Daintith and A. Page, The 
Executive in the Constitution (1999).
65 See Ministers of the Crown Act 1975.
66 Carltona Ltd v. Works Commissioners [1943] 2 All ER 560.
67 But see I. Nicholson, The Mystery of Crichel Down (1986).
68 Hansard, HC, cols. 1285–7 (20 July 1954) (Home Secretary David Maxwell Fyfe).
69 A. Birch, Representative and Responsible Government (1964).
70 For a useful overview, see C. Moran, Classified: Secrecy and the State in Modern Britain (2012).
71 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Feb 25 2015, NEWGEN
he-9780198709824-part-2.indd   204 25-02-2015   10:31:05
A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN WESTMINSTER 205
House of Commons with a view to securing cross-the-board scrutiny of departmental 
policy and administration.72
AGE OF M A NAGE R I A L SM
Previous editions of this book posed the question: ‘The Executive: Towards Accountable 
Government and Effective Governance?’ Behind this seemingly unending quest lay a 
well-known narrative: the shift toward more market-oriented, performance driven, 
and ‘business-like’ modes of public service delivery beginning in earnest with Prime 
Minister Thatcher.73 Much would be heard of the functional values of ‘economy, effi-
ciency, and effectiveness’ and, associated with a rule-bound methodology of targeted 
goals, standard-setting, performance indicators, measurement and control, and ‘value 
for money’ (VFM) audit, something called ‘New Public Management’ (NPM).74 In 
terms of accountability for performance, considerable confidence was reposed in 
transparency via detailed specification, as with advanced forms of contracting-out 
of public services, and in pseudo-market forces, as with citizens as consumers and 
‘league tables’ of public bodies.
Attention is drawn to the fashion for ‘agencification’; in constitutional terms, more 
autonomous decision-making by so-called arm’s-length public bodies operating out-
side the classic lines of ministerial hierarchical control hitherto associated with cen-
tralist practices of parliamentarianism. To this effect, demands for sharp issue focus 
and specialist expertise locked up with the prevailing market ideology and, an even 
stronger driver today,75 burgeoning European demands for ‘independent’ regulation 
in the Single Market. Testifying to the strength of the broad development, the ugly 
term ‘distributed public governance’ would soon be used to underscore the sense of 
greater institutional complexity; and, further, of the old top-down British view of ‘the 
executive’ being reworked so as to incorporate broader and more flexible elements of 
decision-making founded on myriad policy communities and networks.76 Meanwhile, 
the related metaphor of ‘hollowing out of the state’ suitably highlighted the passage 
of central government functions sideways to agencies and (via privatization, etc.) to 
business, as well as upwards to Brussels.77
Arm’s-length bodies would exhibit many forms, ranging through executive agen-
cies tasked with day-to-day implementation of policies, powerful non-ministerial 
72 G. Drewry (ed.), The New Select Committees (1985).
73 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (2nd edn, 1997). For another flavour of the times, 
see P. Hennessy, Whitehall (1989).
74 As illustrated by G. Hammerschmid et al., Public Administration Reform in Europe (2013), the precise 
contours of NPM remain contested.
75 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration (2014).
76 M.  Flinders, Delegated Governance and the British State (2008). For the government/governance 
distinction, see R. Rhodes, ‘The New Governance:  Governing without Government’ (1996) 44 Political 
Studies 652.
77 R. Rhodes, ‘The Hollowing Out of the State: The Changing Nature of the Public Service in Britain’ 
(1994) 65 Pol Q 138.
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departments such as HM Revenue & Customs, and all those so-called ‘quan-
gos’: non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) with their own legal personality but 
subject to greater or lesser forms of ‘steering’ by ministers through strategic direction 
and guidance, funding, etc.78 Privatization also meant new regulatory agencies armed 
(if weakly) with statutory powers across broad swathes of the functioning economy. 
For present purposes, the rise of executive agencies—referred to in the Thatcher 
years as ‘next steps agencies’79—further serves to illustrate the important role of ‘soft 
law’ techniques in the internal organization and workings of the executive. Cut out 
of monolithic central departments, bodies like the Prisons Service or the Highways 
Agency would thus remain paper creations, operating according to published frame-
work documents agreed by ministers. By the early 1990s, our model student would 
have been visualizing the situation in terms of ‘hub-and-spoke’: not so much insti-
tutional pyramids but policy-oriented departmental cores flanked by, or working in 
partnership with, multiple executive agencies. To which would promptly be added the 
unsurprising ‘core executive thesis’ of a small number of powerful institutions like the 
Treasury doing much by way of policy-setting, business coordination, and oversight 
above the level of departments.80
Concern was naturally expressed about the effects on classic forms of political 
accountability. The touchstone is the adoption in 1997 of resolutions in both Houses 
changing the doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility from an unwritten con-
stitutional convention into the express parliamentary rule that ‘ministers have a duty 
to Parliament to account, and be held to account, for the policies, decisions and actions 
of their departments and executive agencies’.81 This followed a well-known imbroglio 
over operational failures in the Prison Service, which saw the minister demand the 
chief executive’s resignation and the chief executive allege that the minister interfered 
in operational matters while seeking to avoid responsibility for failures in respect 
of which—shades of Haldane—he was accountable to Parliament.82 Predictably, the 
general issue has rumbled on, with senior parliamentarians holding to the line of no 
constitutional difference between the terms responsibility and accountability in the 
face of restrictive executive views of ministerial obligation.83 The proper function-
ing of the Westminster model of parliamentary government, it may be said, demands 
nothing less.
The election of Tony Blair’s New Labour government famously heralded much by 
way of constitutional change, some of which bears directly on the position of the Civil 
78 For this (simple) threefold classification, see House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 
The Accountability of Civil Servants, HL 61 (2012–13), ch. 5.
79 UK Cabinet Office, Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps (1988).
80 M. Smith, The Core Executive in Britain (1999).
81 Hansard, HC, cols. 1046–7 (19 March 1997); HL, cols. 1055–62 (20 March 1977).
82 A. Barker, ‘Political Responsibility for UK Prison Security: Ministers Escape Again’ (1998) 76 Public 
Administration 1.
83 Government Response to the Lords Constitution Committee’s Report on the Accountability of Civil 
Servants (February 2013).
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Service. One thinks immediately of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, which for all 
its many exceptions has clearly changed much in the day-to-day working assumptions.84 
However, to anticipate the argument in the next section, ‘devolution’ constituted the 
more profound change. Another product of a tortuous history, Northern Ireland already 
had a separately organized Civil Service. But the (re-)birth of parliamentary and govern-
mental institutions in Scotland and Wales also required mirroring inside the home Civil 
Service. Officials in Edinburgh and Cardiff would now owe their day-to-day loyalty not 
to London but to their own ministers (a constitutional position subsequently formalized 
in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 201085).
Rather than reverse the paradigm shift denoted by ‘the Thatcher revolution’—rolling 
back the extended administrative state and imposing competitive disciplines—the 
Blair government aimed to soften some of the effects.86 In supplementing hard-edged 
functional values with responsive nostrums of public service, a 1999 White Paper 
set the tone:  linking citizen choice to improved service standards and delivery, it 
spoke bravely of forward-looking, inclusive, and fair policies.87 From computerized 
front-line decision-making to new opportunities for citizen participation or at least 
consultation, stress was rightly laid on the potentials for ‘e-governance’ in light of the 
revolution in ICT. Naturally, however, the looming prospect of a surveillance society,88 
and, latterly underscored in the so-called ‘war against terror’, the expanding capacities 
of the security state, were glossed over.
Risk regulation would be a leitmotif of UK public administration under New 
Labour.89 Behind this lay the (worldwide) search for ‘better’ and/or ‘smart’ regula-
tion founded on principles of proportionality, consistency and targeting, and trans-
parency and accountability.90 Demonstrating the way in which some Conservative 
approaches were taken to new heights, this helped to fuel the rise of super-agencies 
such as OFCOM, the telecommunications regulator, and the Financial Services 
Authority (later abolished in the wake of the 2007–8 global financial crisis). It was 
then a time of regulatory commissions, extended regulatory objectives, and enhanced 
enforcement powers, as well as heightened process requirements.91 Distributed pub-
lic governance writ large, this determinedly sprawling development represented 
the apotheosis in the UK of a familiar if contested concept in law and political sci-
ence: the regulatory state.92
84 See further, Patrick Birkinshaw’s chapter.
85 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, s. 7.
86 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn, 2009).
87 Modernising Government, Cm 4130 (1999).
88 See especially House of Lords Constitution Committee, Surveillance: Citizens and the State, HL 18 
(2008–9).
89 E. Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (2007),
90 R. Baldwin, M. Cave, and M. Lodge, Understanding Regulation (2nd edn, 2011).
91 See e.g. House of Lords Constitution Committee, The Regulatory State: Ensuring its Accountability, 
HL 68 (2003–4).
92 M.  Moran, The British Regulatory State (2003); D.  Oliver, T.  Prosser, and R.  Rawlings (eds.), The 
Regulatory State: Constitutional Implications (2010).
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To Prime Minister Gordon Brown goes the accolade of finally delivering one of 
Northcote–Trevelyan’s main recommendations: a clear statutory basis for the Civil 
Service and hence at least partial release from the arcane mysteries of prerogative 
power.93 If by comparison with some other common law jurisdictions94 the provi-
sion in the Constitutional Reform and Governance (CRAG) Act 2010 is limited, 
nonetheless some of it is appropriately described as constitutionally fundamental. 
The development also shows the scope for close interplay between hard and soft law 
techniques, with the statute effectively underpinning, and promoting the further 
elaboration of, pre-existing requirements in the Civil Service Code. In trumpeting 
the core values, s. 7 of the Act thus provides that ‘the code must require civil serv-
ants to carry out their duties . . . with integrity and honesty . . . and with objectivity 
and impartiality’. An updated version of the Code then explains that objectivity for 
example includes not ignoring inconvenient facts or relevant considerations when 
providing advice or making decisions (a formulation which the judicial review prac-
titioner would immediately recognize).95 Meanwhile, corresponding provisions in 
the Ministerial Code state that ‘Ministers must uphold the political impartiality of 
the Civil Service and not ask civil servants to act in any way which would conflict 
with the Civil Service Code.’96 Other key legislative statements in CRAG include 
the merit principle (‘a person’s selection must be on merit on the basis of fair and 
open competition’ (s. 10)) and separate legal status for the Civil Service Commission, 
the arm’s-length body which oversees recruitment competitions for senior officials 
(s. 2). The development, it is rightly said, hardly amounts to a revolution in UK public 
administration; the imposition of formal legal norms should not distract from the 
overarching importance of organizational culture.97 The constitutional significance 
is nonetheless worth emphasizing. Through this assertion by Parliament of its pri-
mary authority on the regulation of the Civil Service,98 there is some further defence 
against unwarranted political interference. Doings under the Cameron–Clegg gov-
ernment will be seen later highlighting this aspect.
R AGBAG
Ad hoc and piecemeal, naturally politically driven, it is a commonplace that changes 
in the UK’s constitutional arrangements happen on the hoof.99 Yet viewed against 
this backdrop, the Coalition’s dealings with the machinery of government appear 
93 On which see Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (the famous 
‘GCHQ case’).
94 For a comparative perspective, see IPPR, Accountability and Responsiveness in the Senior Civil 
Service: Lessons from Overseas (2013).
95 UK Civil Service Code (2010 version), para. 10. 96 UK Ministerial Code, para. 5.1.
97 Drewry (ed.), The New Select Committees, 209, 212.
98 See in this vein, A. Tomkins, The Constitution After Scott (1998).
99 D. Oliver, ‘Politics, Law and Constitutional Moments in the UK’ in D. Feldman (ed.), Law in Politics, 
Politics in Law (2013).
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more than usually disjointed. On the one hand, the evident need to tackle a huge 
budget deficit in the wake of the global economic crisis was a powerful factor: a more 
stringent approach to the public sector at large was only to be expected. On the other 
hand, careful and joined-up thinking about important matters of institutional—and 
hence constitutional—design proved hostage to the particular exigencies of the 
moment.
A Conservative-led government seeking to roll back the boundaries of agen-
cification:  the irony will not be lost on the reader. The policy was one of the key 
constitutional initiatives of the Coalition’s early years and had in theory much to 
commend it. A seeming bonfire of the quangos, the Minister for the Cabinet Office 
spoke of restoring political accountability for decisions affecting people’s lives 
and the way taxpayers’ money is spent; individual NDPBs should only be retained 
where there was a demonstrable need for performance of a technical function, or 
for political impartiality, or for acting independently to establish facts.100 But the 
bill which eventually became the Public Bodies Act 2011 was the business man-
ager’s nightmare; living up to its unkind nickname of ‘quango of the quangos’, the 
Upper House duly deliberated at great length on the great virtues of executive bod-
ies on which sit the great and good. Ministers reckoned to pre-empt much in the 
public debate by using so-called ‘Henry VIII clause’ powers on an industrial scale 
to abolish, merge, and transfer functions; happily, however, from the standpoint 
of constitutional—democratic—principle, this too raised the ire of senior parlia-
mentarians.101 In the event, the government could point to some major savings in 
the costs of running public bodies (some £900  million per year).102 Nonetheless, 
the reform proved something of a damp squib, certainly if an official UK govern-
ment list of some 500 NDPBs (grouped round 24 ministerial departments or offices) 
is anything to go by.103 For confirmation, one need only refer to a 2014 review by 
the Public Administration Select Committee (PASC), which speaks of ‘inconsist-
ency, overlaps, confusion and clutter’.104 There also were some unfortunate casual-
ties, for example the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council, a harmless little 
body which was doing good work in promoting principled guidance, training and 
research concerning citizen grievance.105
Highlighting some complaints by ministers of deliberate obstruction of policy deci-
sions, and also their concerns about institutional constraints in terms of competence 
and culture, media reports of a ‘Whitehall at war’ abounded under the Cameron–Clegg 
100 Francis Maude MP, UK Cabinet Office statement, 14 October 2010; see further, Institute for 
Government, Read before Burning: Arm’s Length Government for a New Administration (2010).
101 House of Lords Constitution Committee, Public Bodies Bill, HL 51(2010–11).
102 UK Cabinet Office, Progress on Public Bodies Reform (2013).
103 UK Cabinet Office, Public Bodies (2013).
104 Public Administration Select Committee, Who’s Accountable? Relationships between Government 
and Arm’s Length Bodies, HC 110 (2014–15), para. 78. See further, K. Dommett et al., ‘Did they “Read Before 
Burning”? The Coalition and Quangos’ (2014) 85 Pol Q 133.
105 AJTC, Putting it Right (2012).
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administration. Members of select committees were naturally interested to get to the 
bottom of this, yet, faced by ministers’ failure to improve on anecdote with a firm 
evidence base, they struggled to do so. In PASC’s weary words, ‘the Government has 
not . . . identified any fundamental problem with the Civil Service’.106 Equally however, 
PASC was scathing about the government’s initial failure to produce any sort of Civil 
Service reform plan: for change not to be defeated by inertia, ministers needed to set 
clear goals and pursue implementation through close timetabling.107
Ministers eventually published a Plan in 2012.108 Predictably in this age of auster-
ity, the chief demand was for a much smaller Civil Service. Connecting with the rise 
of e-governance (a ‘digital by default’ approach to the delivery of services), but also 
sitting comfortably with Conservative ideology, cuts of roughly 25 per cent in staff 
numbers were envisaged. In the event, staffing would fall from some 480,000 at the 
Spending Review in 2010 to some 410,000 by mid-2014.109 Flanking initiatives in the 
Plan included more outsourcing, to the extent of ‘think-tanks’ bidding to provide pol-
icy advice, and, with a view to tackling a familiar source of government blunders,110 
attempts to improve the handling of major projects. Especially noteworthy from the 
constitutional standpoint was the demand by Coalition ministers for a greater say in 
senior appointments in order to reflect their own accountability to Parliament for a 
department’s performance111—for which read downplaying Civil Service independ-
ence from political masters in favour of (still greater) responsiveness to the govern-
ment of the day.112
An official evaluation in 2013 confirmed that the government was ‘slow to mobilise’; 
indeed, implementation of the Plan had been ‘held back by some of the very things 
that it was designed to address’—‘weaknesses in capability’, ‘lack of clear account-
ability’, and failings in (something called) ‘delivery discipline’.113 Lamenting the 
many difficulties of driving forward bureaucratic reform across largely autonomous 
and sprawling departmental structures, an external evaluation in early 2014 further 
pointed up ‘weak and confused’ leadership at the centre.114 Even so, at the same time 
as having to provide effective support for radical ministerial agendas in various policy 
domains, the Civil Service at large was already making unprecedented costs-savings. 
A second official evaluation in late 2014 put a braver face on matters, to the effect of a 
reform programme gradually picking up speed.115 It spoke of ‘real progress towards 
106 PASC, Truth to Power, 3.
107 Public Administration Select Committee, Change in Government: The Agenda for Leadership, HC 
714 (2010–12).
108 UK Cabinet Office, Civil Service Reform Plan (June 2012).
109 For the number-crunching, see Institute for Government, Whitehall Monitor (Annual Report, 2014).
110 For chapter and verse, see A. King and I. Crewe, The Blunders of our Governments (2013).
111 UK Cabinet Office, Civil Service Reform Plan, 21.
112 On the further, vexed, issue of special advisers, see B. Yong and R. Hazell, Special Advisers: Who They 
Are, What They Do and Why They Matter (2014).
113 Civil Service Reform Plan: One Year On (2013), 5.
114 Institute for Government, Leading Change in the Civil Service (2014), 9.
115 UK Cabinet Office, Civil Service Reform: Progress Report (2014).
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the government’s vision of a service that is more skilled, less bureaucratic and hierar-
chical, and more unified’.116 Time will tell.
Meanwhile, the scene had been set for a fine establishment imbroglio over the 
position of permanent secretaries. With the declared aim of strengthening their 
individual accountability, ministers announced an immediate move to fixed ten-
ure (five-year contracts) for all new appointments at this exalted level.117 However, 
praying in aid Northcote–Trevelyan and the concerns about personal favouritism 
and patronage, the Civil Service Commission stoutly resisted the further idea of 
substituting direct ministerial choice for the (rarely exercised) prime ministerial 
power to veto the independently selected candidate. At this point the CRAG Act 
bit home, with Coalition ministers effectively being dared to amend the provisions 
enshrining the merit principle and the role of the Commission. By the end of 2012 
an uneasy compromise had resulted, with revised Commission guidance allowing 
for multiple consultations with the relevant Secretary of State.118 In the face however 
of renewed party political pressure, the Commission evidently felt obliged to cede 
more ground. As from late 2014, the prime minister is allowed to interview and 
choose the top-most civil servants in Whitehall, those heading the main depart-
ments and directly accountable to a Cabinet Minister.119 Yes, the merit principle 
remains in place, buttressed by the safeguard of an independent panel dealing with 
the shortlist, but the development naturally reinforces concerns about politicization 
of the Civil Service. Perhaps hopefully, an important constitutional principle has 
been dented and not fractured.
Happenings at the very centre of government highlight the propensity for 
ill-thought-out reform. When chief civil servant Gus O’Donnell retired in 2011, his 
role was divided three ways: Cabinet Secretary; Head of the Home Civil Service; and 
Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office. But as PASC was quick to observe, this was a 
recipe not only for weakened leadership or domestic tension, but also for blurred lines 
of responsibility in the heart of Whitehall.120 Hardly testimony to success, the chairs 
were then rearranged in the government’s final year: first, by (re-)combining the titles 
of Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service; and, secondly, by conjur-
ing up the title ‘Civil Service Chief Executive’. To compound matters, the latter title 
is misleading. The new office-holder, it is envisaged, will not run things, but instead 
focus on issues of efficiency and effectiveness, reporting in turn to various ministers 
including the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, as well as to the Cabinet Secretary.121 
More higgledy-piggledy beckons.
116 Ibid., foreword.
117 Civil Service Reform Plan: One Year On, 31.
118 Civil Service Commission, Recruiting Permanent Secretaries: Ministerial Involvement (December 2012).
119 Civil Service Commission, press notice 15 October 2014. Within the Scottish and Welsh govern-
ments, it will be the First Minister’s decision.
120 Public Administration Select Committee, Leadership of Change: New Arrangements for the Roles of 
the Head of the Civil Service and the Cabinet Secretary, HC 1582 (2010–12).
121 UK Cabinet Office, Chief Executive Job Description (July 2014). See further, House of Commons 
Public Accounts Committee, The Centre of Government, HC 107 (2014–15).
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As regards the broader constitutional issue of ministerial and/or Civil Service 
accountability, matters plumbed the depths with the collapse in 2012 of the tender-
ing process for the West Coast Main Line.122 Triggered by a claim for judicial review, 
this expensive and embarrassing debacle for the government produced a blame game 
both inside and outside the department. The affair sheds light on the complex web 
of organizational factors likely to be involved when things go wrong. Yes, there were 
major errors by front-line officials, but there also were insufficient specialist staff, lit-
tle by way of institutional memory, serious failings in line management, and so on. 
Individual shortcomings, long experience teaches, should not be allowed to obscure 
wider defects in systems, skills, and culture for which others are responsible.
In the light of broader moves towards Westminster asserting its authority over 
Whitehall, and more particularly the evident ambition of certain parliamentary 
committees,123 there would be more calls to open up the accountability of civil servants 
to MPs.124 Yet as the Constitution Committee125 was soon reminding its readers, the 
convention of individual ministerial responsibility effectively contains the principal 
mechanism of Civil Service accountability, while also grounding much of the day-to-
day conduct of government business and associated scrutiny in the Westminster sys-
tem. So although it might be supplemented by other accountability mechanisms, these 
should not dilute ministers’ constitutional responsibility to Parliament. Indeed, in the 
case of thoroughgoing institutional reform of the NHS in England, the Constitution 
Committee had effectively demanded a statutory guarantee of continuing ministerial 
responsibility for provision of the service, a constitutional ‘first’ at Westminster.126
A chief touchstone is the so-called ‘Osmotherly Rules’, the government’s (and not 
Parliament’s) guidance to officials appearing before committees in both Houses. 
Originally couched in highly restrictive language, but liberalized somewhat over the 
years, this classic soft law document continues to underwrite important classical under-
standings. Eventually published in October 2014, the current version emphasizes that 
civil servants giving evidence do so, ‘not in a personal capacity, but as representatives of 
their Ministers’.127 This, it is (tortuously) explained, ‘does not mean that officials may not 
be called upon to give a full account of government policies, or the justification, objec-
tives and effects of these policies’. Rightly however the purpose in doing so is ‘to contrib-
ute to the process of ministerial accountability’; likewise, better to avoid undermining 
their political impartiality, it is ‘not to offer personal views or judgements on matters of 
government policy’. In particular, officials ‘should as far as possible avoid being drawn 
into discussion of the merits of alternative policies, including their advice to Ministers’.128 
122 Report of the Laidlaw Inquiry, HC 809 (2012–13); House of Commons Transport Committee, 
Cancellation of the InterCity West Coast Franchise Competition, HC 537 (2012–13).
123 See Philip Norton’s chapter in this volume (ch. 6).
124 Institute for Government, Civil Service Accountability to Parliament (2013).
125 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, The Accountability of Civil Servants.
126 House of Lords Constitution Committee, Health and Social Care Bill, HL 197 (2010–12); and Health 
and Social Care Bill: Follow-up, HL 240 (2010–12); Health and Social Care Act 2012, s. 1.
127 UK Cabinet Office, Giving Evidence to Select Committees: Evidence to Select Committees (2014), para. 5.
128 Ibid., paras. 6, 33.
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The new guidance contributes two useful tweaks. First, underpinning a constitutio-
nally important piece of machinery, former Accounting Officers can now expect to be 
called in to give evidence about their previous responsibilities. Secondly, reflect-
ing the contemporary realities of government management, the lead officials (‘Senior 
Responsible Owners’) on major projects will now be directly accountable at Westminster 
for implementation.
Looking forward, PASC makes a powerful case for the establishment of a par-
liamentary commission into the Civil Service.129 This would concentrate on the 
strategic long-term vision or basic issues of role and structure, while facilitating 
proper—public—debate of the different constitutional implications. As well as the 
internal relationship between the centre and departments, it would be important to 
consider changing patterns of Civil Service structures and responsibilities in the con-
text of a loosening Union state—a point missed by PASC. Fifty years on from Fulton, 
questions of skills and culture also need revisiting, not least because of the immediate 
and incessant demands of transparency and public scrutiny that so characterize our 
digital age. Sitting comfortably with the assertion of legislative power in the CRAG 
Act, an explicitly parliamentary dimension has much to commend it.
SHOCK WAV E S :  U K (E NGL ISH) G OV E R N M E N T
T H E E X E C U T I V E (S)  I N T H E U N ION
The Cameron–Clegg administration will go down in history as the government which 
nearly lost the Union. The sight of a complacent and then panicked Westminster 
elite vowing130 major constitutional reform—‘devo-more’ or ‘faster, safer and bet-
ter change’—in the face of an exercise in (Scottish) popular sovereignty131 will live 
long in folk memory. Looking forward, the shock waves generated by the hard-fought 
campaign and close ‘no’ vote in the Scottish independence referendum will continue 
to reverberate, effectively heralding a looser form of Union (state). If the precise con-
tours currently defy prediction, old unitary-style understandings of what is denoted 
by the ‘Executive’ (and ‘Parliament’) will need revisiting. Reflecting the fact of sev-
eral governments or the sharing (out) of executive power among the Union ‘family’ of 
countries, using the conceptual label ‘UK (English) government’ with reference to an 
imperiously titled ‘Her Majesty’s Government’ is a fair start.
Viewed through the lens of individual ministerial responsibility, another look 
round the UK Cabinet table is revealing. The prime minister, the deputy prime min-
ister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer obviously straddle the UK and English 
129 PASC, Truth to Power; see further, Hansard, HL, cols. 354–93 (16 January 2014).
130 Daily Record, 16 September 2014.
131 As facilitated by the (Edinburgh) Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish 
Government on an Independence Referendum for Scotland (October 2012). See A. Tomkins, ‘Scotland’s 
Choice, Britain’s Future’, (2014) 130 LQR 215.
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dimensions of policy. Determinedly pan-Union elements are exemplified by the 
Secretaries of State for Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Conversely, 
high-spend departments led by the Secretaries of State for Education, Health, and 
Communities and Local Government, stand for a distinctively English territorial or 
spatial component132—to the extent, it might be said mischievously, that the (histori-
cally hallowed) designation is misleading: ‘State’, what ‘English State’? Meanwhile, 
voices for the ‘others’, but today largely stripped of day-to-day decision-making 
responsibilities, the Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
bring up the rear.
More product of convoluted histories, there are of course other functional 
motifs:  ‘Great Britain’, as mostly with the Department for Work and Pensions in 
standing for a ‘social union’, and more particularly ‘England and Wales’, as with Home 
Office and Ministry of Justice responsibilities for policing and criminal justice, and 
courts and prisons, respectively.133 In a polity as large and complex as the UK, overlap-
ping and interlocking responsibilities are common, a point further underscored in the 
administrative procedural context of EU membership.134 Collective responsibility and 
efforts at joined-up policies, key elements of commonality in the Home Civil Service,135 
and, yes, a sense of ‘Britishness’, necessarily contribute to the broader Whitehall 
mix. All this said however, the basic duality of UK (English) government, as also the 
propensity with a loosening Union further to accentuate the English dimension,136  
shines through.
Today, it is not simply that ‘devolution’ is centre-stage in UK-wide constitutional 
debates. The ‘devolution mindset’ which starts with the assumption that the UK is 
fundamentally a centralized state (if never a wholly unitary one137) is itself chal-
lenged. Representing a determinedly more advanced form of constitutional think-
ing, most obviously in terms of greater institutional pluralism and diversity, a ‘New 
Union’  mindset138 speaks directly to a state boasting several systems of parliamentary 
government grounded in popular sovereignty and cooperating for mutual benefit. 
‘Devolution’, it may be said, is not only about how each country is separately governed, 
but also the whole governance of the UK, the starting point being four administrations 
132 On the argument for tidying away the few exceptions through Transfer of Functions Orders, see 
Society of Conservative Lawyers, Our Quasi-Federal Kingdom (2014).
133 See further on this chameleon-like quality, R. Hazell and R. Rawlings (eds.), Devolution, Law Making 
and the Constitution (2005).
134 Harlow and Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration.
135 See further, Institute for Government, The Civil Service in Territorial Perspective (2014). Interestingly, 
the Scottish government’s submission to the Smith Commission (see later) did not make an issue of this.
136 Ongoing debates over policing and prisons provide immediate illustration in the case of England and 
Wales: see (Silk) Commission on Devolution in Wales, Empowerment and Responsibility: Legislative Powers 
to Strengthen Wales (2014), ch. 10. See also, Secretary of State for Wales Stephen Crabb, ‘A Long Term Vision 
on Devolution’ (2014).
137 See latterly, L. Colley, Acts of Union, Acts of Disunion (2013).
138 As elaborated in particular by Welsh First Minister Carwyn Jones, ‘Constitutional Reform in the 
UK: A Federal Future?’ (2014).
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which are, in the words of a Welsh government notably committed to the Union, ‘in 
a relationship which is not hierarchical’.139 In this perspective, the fact of ‘national 
devolution’140 to Scotland and Wales, with all the political and symbolic capital which 
this implies, and of course the huge sensitivities associated with the peace process 
in Northern Ireland,141 should never be forgotten. Set in these terms, conflating 
‘Whitehall’ with ‘the Executive’ is highly misleading. Perhaps hopefully, the behav-
iour of what in the old lexicon is ‘central government’ will be moulded accordingly.
Public discussion of the legal architecture of human rights protection serves to 
point up the practical connotations. Evidencing a severe lack of joined-up thinking 
in public law, the general accounts at first focused almost exclusively on the Human 
Rights Act 1998, so passing over the doubled protection in three of the four coun-
tries of the Union by virtue of the direct incorporation of provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights into the 1998 devolution statutes.142 As late as 2012, 
members of the independent Commission on a Bill of Rights were apparently sur-
prised to learn that the Celtic polities might have their own human rights commit-
ments to nurture and defend.143 At the time of writing, it is the Conservatives’ plan 
to replace the Human Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights and Responsibilities 
which commands attention. In the words of the policy document, ‘we will work with 
the devolved administrations and legislatures as necessary to make sure there is an 
effective new settlement across the UK’.144 Of course behind this lies Dicey’s (English) 
doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, reserved powers, and all that. But while the 
Whitehall–Westminster axis is dominant in so many ways, countervailing dynamics 
of constrained authority ranging across the creative legislative power of the ‘other’ 
systems, the political discipline of the Sewel Convention,145 and the overarching sense 
of a fragile Union, are brought sharply into focus here. If they ever materialize, the 
projected encounters should be lively.
The wide range of submissions made to the Smith Commission, hastily assembled 
to facilitate talks in the light of the three pro-Union parties’ ‘vow’,146 illuminates the 
competing demands for recalibration—further hollowing-out—of Whitehall capaci-
ties as part of the move to a looser Union. The Scottish government (SNP) paper natu-
rally propounded the (slippery) concept of ‘devo-max’, for which read minimizing 
139 Welsh Government, Evidence to the (Silk) Commission on Devolution in Wales (February 2013), 
para. 5.
140 R.  Rawlings, Delineating Wales:  Constitutional, Legal and Administrative Aspects of National 
Devolution (2003).
141 See Brice Dickson’s chapter in this volume (ch. 9).
142 See R. Rawlings, ‘Taking Wales Seriously’ in T. Campbell, K. Ewing, and A. Tomkins (eds.), Sceptical 
Essays on Human Rights (2001).
143 Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us (2 vols. 2012).
144 Conservative Party, Protecting Human Rights in the UK, 6.
145 Hansard, HL, col. 791 (21 July 1998).
146 See the prime minister’s press statement, ‘Scottish Independence Referendum’ (19 September 2014). 
The three parties’ proposals rehashed their existing policy offers: see Scottish Office, The Parties’ Published 
Proposals for Further Devolution to Scotland, Cm 8946 (2014); Hansard, HC, cols. 168–271(14 October 2014).
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(at least in respect of Scotland) the UK component of UK (English) government.147 This 
is the stuff, on the one hand, of full fiscal autonomy, and, on the other hand, of a very 
basic core (monetary policy; foreign policy, defence, and security; citizenship). At the 
other end of the spectrum, Labour envisaged some limited expansion of tax devolution148 
as well as some further devolution of specific welfare benefits. The profound nature of 
the constitutional challenge for a political party historically associated with large-scale 
and creative uses of the power of dominium or deployment of wealth by the (central) 
state is made apparent.149 The intermediate position propounded by the Conservatives 
is especially noteworthy: a major party with a long track record of opposing devolution 
now envisaging the virtual cession of income tax powers. Nor is it entirely surprising to 
find the Commission, tasked with brokering a deal, publishing heads of agreement along 
these lines: INFORMED PREDICTION OBVIOUSLY! UPDATE150 Projecting forwards 
into the new UK Parliament, another Scotland Bill will see HM Government losing some 
more pan-Union policy space.151
E NGL A N D, T H E I R E NGL A N D
England has been the spectre at the devolution feast. But events in Scotland have predict-
ably served to (re)focus attention on the so-called ‘English question’, the well-known col-
lection of problems about how England should be governed in a looser Union, particular 
twists like devolution finance and the dreaded ‘West Lothian question’,152 and, ultimately, 
social and cultural issues of (national) identity or sense of belonging.153 As for the field of 
choice, some reform options appear more constitutionally challenging than others not 
least because of the implications for UK (English) government.
Suggestions for new structures of English localism abound, blending in turn into 
bigger projects for so-called ‘city-states’ and, despite having been unsuccessfully 
trailed under New Labour, regional assemblies. The signing in November 2014 of 
a ‘devolution plan’ for Greater Manchester, centred on an elected mayor with pow-
ers over transport, planning, housing, and policing, is a milestone in this regard.154 
Much in the general argument is commendable, especially with a view to democratic 
renewal155 and in light of the exceeding economic and political dominance of London, 
147 Scottish Government, More Powers for the Scottish Parliament (2014); building on the White Paper, 
Your Scotland, Your Voice (2009).
148 Building in turn on the taxing and expenditure powers contained in the Scotland Act 2012. The Wales 
Bill 2014 contains more limited financial powers. UPDATE
149 See Gordon Brown, My Scotland, Our Britain (2014).
150 Smith Commission, Ref (November 2014). UPDATE
151 Following on the UK Government’s draft legislative proposals published in January 2015. UPDATE
152 R. Hazell (ed.), The English Question (Manchester University Press, 2005); also, IPPR, Answering the 
English Question: a new policy agenda for England (2008).
153 M. Kenny, The Politics of English Nationhood (2014).
154 HM Treasury, Greater Manchester Agreement (2014). See further, Ian Leigh’s chapter.
155 IPPR, Decentralisation decade: A plan for economic prosperity, public service transformation and dem-
ocratic renewal in England (2014).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Feb 25 2015, NEWGEN
he-9780198709824-part-2.indd   216 25-02-2015   10:31:06
A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN WESTMINSTER 217
constitutionally underscored these days by a Greater London Authority made up of the 
directly elected Mayor and Assembly.156 From a ‘New Union’ perspective, there would also 
be some worthwhile diluting of England in Whitehall, most obviously in terms of budg-
ets. Looking forward, the Commons’ Communities and Local Government Committee 
recently made a compelling case for what it termed ‘devolution in England’ with special 
reference to fiscal devolution.157 After all, the historical legacy of developing Whitehall 
dominium underwritten by, but also predating, the Thatcher government, there is ‘by 
international standards . . . a highly centralised system of taxation and expenditure’.158
Then there is EVEL, the constitutional mantra of ‘English votes for English laws’. 
Confirming the strong sense of dissatisfaction with how England is currently gov-
erned, the leading attitudinal survey indicates substantial and increased support for 
this type of approach.159 Add in the particular challenge for a Labour Party histori-
cally strong in Scotland and Wales, and more immediately the evident populist appeal 
of UKIP, and the political conditions were ripe for the prime minister immediately 
to link the Scottish ‘vow’ and ‘no’ vote to requiring a ‘decisive answer’ on EVEL.160 
The idea is hardly new. Indeed, much in the constitutional discussion is tediously 
familiar: on the one hand, claims about lack of fairness and/or accommodation of 
Englishness; on the other, concerns about knock-on effects and different classes of 
MPs (and hence the long-term viability of the Union), as well as technical issues of pro-
cedure and definition. Yet the basic duality of UK (English) government bears directly 
on the matter. Adopted in strong form, broad veto powers perhaps on the command 
of law or exercise of imperium, EVEL could conjure risks for governability, and indeed 
for collective responsibility, precisely because of the element of division. A product 
of the Coalition’s Programme for Government, the independent Mackay Commission 
was thus understandably cautious in proposing instead close deliberation and forceful 
recommendation by an English committee of MPs.161 This lesser form of EVEL could 
be tolerated by Whitehall.162
The idea of an ‘English Parliament’ obviously is qualitatively different.163 In nota-
bly paradoxical fashion, the sheer size of the country—some 85 per cent of the UK 
population—has been seen to present an insuperable difficulty (assuming, that is, the 
continued existence of the Union).164 Multiple potentials for problems of governability 
156 Greater London Authority Act 1999, as amended.
157 House of Commons, Communities and Local Government Committee, Devolution in England: The 
Case for Local Government, HC 503 (2014/15).
158 Ibid, para. 5.
159 C. Jeffery et al. (eds.), Taking England Seriously: The New English Politics. The Future of England Survey 
(2014).
160 Via referral to a UK Cabinet Committee: ‘Scottish Independence Referendum’ (19 September 2014).
161 Report of the (Mackay) Commission on the Consequences of Devolution for the House of Commons 
(2013).
162 For the further idea of blocking up multiple territorial functions into a single ‘England Office’, see 
Local Government Association, Rewiring Public Services (2013).
163 Campaign for an English Parliament, at http://thecep.org.uk/.
164 Hence part of the argument against a formal federal solution: Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution, the Kilbrandon Commission (1973).
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or stand-offs with the UK Parliament present a grim spectre; indeed, the currency 
markets could have a field day. But our discerning student will happily press the mat-
ter. Constitutional responsibility according to the Westminster model: does not an 
‘English Parliament’ in practice mean an ‘English government’ (first minister, treas-
ury minister, departments and all)? So where, goes the not so gentle inquiry, is the 
great popular clamour for a bigger governing class? Or is the duality of UK (English) 
government somehow to be catered for via two separate representative institutions? 
Prime minister’s garb on Mondays and Tuesdays perhaps, first minister’s attire later in 
the week: such would be a constitutional theatre of the absurd.
BE YON D C ON S T I T U T IONA L PAT R I A RC H Y
‘Asymmetrical quasi-federalism’ is not a phrase to set the pulses racing. But it sug-
gests a constitutional way of life which Whitehall will be increasingly challenged to 
adopt.165 Referencing ‘New Union’-style thinking in suitably flexible fashion, their 
chief institutions are thus said to embody democratic accountability in the four con-
stituent countries, with more or less pooling of powers and resources in the light of 
particular historic, demographic, and economic considerations. Simply put, the rou-
tine workings of Dicey’s doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty may be fine for the 
English but not for everybody else. In this determinedly rich perspective, the limited 
appeal of formal federal structures does not negate the case for a strong dose of fed-
eral thinking in the UK constitution: quite the reverse. Typically then, the talk is of 
enabling unity while guaranteeing diversity through a process of balancing power in 
a more differentiated political order.166
Some encouraging noises are made in the concordats, the myriad soft law documen-
tation on principles, structures, and processes first agreed by the four governments in 
1999 with a view to constructive, efficient, and effective forms of intergovernmental 
relations.167 As well as providing for political machinery in the guise(s) of the Joint 
Ministerial Committee, the principal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) thus 
highlights cooperation and consultation, as well as coordination, as basic desiderata.168 
Looking forward, Whitehall will have heightened responsibility for upholding such 
precepts in a looser form of Union characterized by more exclusive territorial author-
ity and much shared interest. To this effect, the political and administrative demands 
are not new but have still greater significance amid the shock waves now rippling 
through the UK constitution.
165 ‘Constitutional Reform in the UK: a Federal Future?’ See also, Institute for Government, Governing 
after the Referendum: Future Constitutional Scenarios for the UK (2014).
166 Citing in particular the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly’s report, Towards a Better 
European Democracy: Facing the Challenges of a Federal Europe (2014).
167 R. Rawlings, ‘Concordats of the Constitution’ (2000) 116 LQR 257.
168 Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements between the United Kingdom 
Government, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, and the Northern Ireland Executive Committee 
(2013 version).
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In fact, whirring away in the background, the bureaucratic modalities of intergov-
ernmental relations have not received the attention they deserve in discussion of the 
changing constitution. Notably, much of the traffic involves matters of bilateral rela-
tions between Whitehall and one of the other governments. Ranging across the spec-
trum from open and friendly dealings to poor awareness and failure to engage, the 
performance of Whitehall departments and policy teams appears decidedly mixed; 
the Welsh government, for example, speaks of ‘professional, business-like, construc-
tive, numerous, complex and sometimes frustrating’ working relationships.169 Despite 
periodic review and fine-tuning of the multilateral machinery, there is continuing 
concern about lack of transparency and organizational skews in favour of Whitehall 
(as through permanent chairing of the JMC’s disputes panel).170 The incipient issue of 
‘two hats’ demands very sensitive handling here.
In grounding a distinctive set of constitutional priorities, ‘New Union’-style think-
ing also provides a litmus test of future constitutional development and, in particular, 
of the behaviour of UK (English) government—most obviously in terms of pathology 
or push-back. Towards the fag-end of the Cameron–Clegg government, a small but 
significant imbroglio broke out over the state of the NHS in Wales. Aided and abetted 
by powerful media interests, the prime minister and the Secretary of State for Health 
went out of their way to criticize performance levels, to the extent of complaining 
about cross-border flows of patients into England.171 Meanwhile, the Labour adminis-
tration in Wales struggled to make its voice heard in rebuttal.172 Inside Whitehall, the 
affair was no doubt considered clever politics ahead of a looming UK general election. 
Yet, not simply a case of robust debate, it can also be viewed as a very public bullying 
of one member of the Union ‘family’ by the most powerful one. Attention is drawn to 
the corrosive potentials for respect and trust, key constitutional qualities on which 
the Union at large ultimately depends. Reverting to concordatry, it has been said that 
locked in the chief MoU and waiting to escape is the fundamental constitutional prin-
ciple of comity.173 It is time it did.
C ONCLUSION
The historical fact of the Cameron–Clegg administration enduring was hardly a 
given in May 2010. Constitutionally speaking, the obvious product is a Fixed-term 
Parliaments Act which itself works to shape future political calculation. But there also 
was some skilful adaptation of governing arrangements, very much in the evolutionary 
169 Welsh Government, Written Statement, 18 June 2013.
170 See e.g. A. Trench (ed.), Devolution and Power in the United Kingdom (2007).
171 Hansard, HC, cols. 753–4 (21 October 2014) and cols. 890–3 (22 October 2014).
172 Record of Proceedings, National Assembly for Wales, 21 October 2014.
173 Rawlings, ‘Concordats of the Constitution’, 267. The reference is to constitutional practice in advanced 
federal systems like Germany (‘Bundestreue’).
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tradition of the UK’s uncodified arrangements. The creative use of soft law technique 
going with the grain of, and elaborating on, essential conventional understandings 
is of the essence of this. Time will tell about the scale of the resulting constitutional 
footprint, though it will surely be more substantial than at first appears. Yes, the 
Cameron–Clegg experiment is only one possible form of response to the political 
arithmetic of no overall majority for a single party, but it would be most odd if future 
constitutional actors did not factor in the seeming strengths and limitations. The fact 
of political and institutional learning involved in novel processes of government for-
mation and operation is itself significant; the later criticism of insufficient procedural 
provision for departures from collective ministerial responsibility is also out there. An 
old truth perhaps, but constitutional effect must be measured not simply by reference 
to what subsequently happens but also what does not.
Tensions between ministers and officials are hardly new, but they were a particular 
feature of life under the Cameron–Clegg government. Punctuated with outbursts of 
negativity, a slew of ad hoc and piecemeal developments also demonstrate the lack of a 
clear sense of direction when dealing with machinery of government issues: the more 
so, when measured against the likes of Northcote–Trevelyan and Haldane and even, 
dare one say it, the Thatcher years. The bonfire or not of quangos, or more accurately 
the scattered burnings, speaks volumes in this regard. Put another way, individual ini-
tiatives may or may not have had merit, but the belated fact of a Civil Service Reform 
Plan cannot obscure the shortcomings—in the context of a loosening Union, one is 
tempted to say myopia—in terms of strategic vision. So too, with reference to other 
developments taking place under the Cameron–Clegg administration, one need not 
be a devoted follower of the mandarinate to insist on the importance of both sides 
of the convention of individual ministerial responsibility; and, in particular, of the 
constitutional value of protecting a professional bureaucracy from political patron-
age. Viewed in the round, it is a poor way of undertaking the task of machinery of 
government reform.
Future historians will surely consider September 2014 and all its works a key 
constitutional moment in the life of this Atlantic archipelago. In the long view, the 
Cameron–Clegg government is apt to pale in significance, though of course it hap-
pened on their watch. Today, the direction of travel is firmly in favour of a looser Union, 
with, speak it loudly, profound implications for the structures, powers, and practices 
of the post-imperial Whitehall machine. This highlights, at one level, the expanding 
distribution of executive responsibilities to other democratically elected governments 
and with it the challenge to old (English) conceptions of constitutional hierarchy; at 
another level, through the concept of UK (English) government, the twin dynamics 
of hollowing the Union component and reworking the largest territorial one; and at 
another level again, the extended premium placed on intergovernmental relations. 
The third part of the chapter has sought to improve on predominantly Anglo-centric 
and Metropolitan views of the changing constitution. Looking forwards, much con-
stitutional and political wisdom will be required, most obviously on the part of minis-
ters in London, if—and it is a big if—the Union is to survive and prosper.
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